Working Papers
Oligopoly and Oligopsony in International Trade. November, 2020 (under review) (with Vladimir Tyazhelnikov)
We study the effects of international trade on firms' oligopsony power in inputs markets. We build a theoretical model of international trade in which firms are oligopolists in the market for final goods and oligopsonists in the market for inputs. Consistent with evidence from the literature, firms' markups increase in both the extent of oligopsony power and of oligopoly power. Trade liberalization in one market reduces firms' market power in such market, but it has the opposite effect in the other market. In particular, international trade between oligopolists in final goods markets causes oligopsony power to increase. Calibrating our model for the US, we find that the reduction in domestic markups generated by international trade are 15-50\% lower due to the presence of oligopsony power.
Large Multiproduct Exporters Across Rich and Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence.
October, 2020 (under review)
Online Appendix
I study the welfare effects of trade in the presence of large firms producing multiple varieties. Large multiproduct exporters dominate trade flows and their scope decisions have new implications for the welfare gains from trade. Using data from the Exporter Dynamics Database, I document two stylized facts for large multiproduct exporters: 1) the product scope increases with the level of development of the destination proxied by per capita income, and 2) as evidence of cannibalization effects, there exists a non-monotone, hump-shaped relationship between the product scope and market share of a firm. Guided by the evidence, I build a model in which income and cannibalization effects drive the scope decisions of large firms, and derive a new formula for the welfare gains from trade. Ignoring income or cannibalization effects causes mismeasurement of the US welfare gains. The sign and size of the mismeasurement is highly heterogeneous across industries.
I study the welfare effects of trade in the presence of large firms producing multiple varieties. Large multiproduct exporters dominate trade flows and their scope decisions have new implications for the welfare gains from trade. Using data from the Exporter Dynamics Database, I document two stylized facts for large multiproduct exporters: 1) the product scope increases with the level of development of the destination proxied by per capita income, and 2) as evidence of cannibalization effects, there exists a non-monotone, hump-shaped relationship between the product scope and market share of a firm. Guided by the evidence, I build a model in which income and cannibalization effects drive the scope decisions of large firms, and derive a new formula for the welfare gains from trade. Ignoring income or cannibalization effects causes mismeasurement of the US welfare gains. The sign and size of the mismeasurement is highly heterogeneous across industries.
Large Firms in Retail Markets: Multiple Products for Heterogeneous Consumers. September 2020 (with Mingzhi Xu and Robert C. Feenstra)
Online Appendix
We study the ability of firms of various sizes to cater to the taste of consumers who differ in their geographic location, store choice, and type or purchase history. Using data on purchases at the household-barcode level from Nielsen, we find that heterogeneity across consumer segments accounts for 39% of the variation in product appeal, which is a key determinant of firm size. Using a model with heterogeneous consumers, we find that consumer heterogeneity increases markups and profits, and such a positive effect is more pronounced for large firms. Furthermore, we find a link between firm size heterogeneity and the strategies firms follow in the presence of heterogeneous consumer segments. While smaller firms cater to the taste of few segments, typically the largest ones, larger firms exploit their wider scope to target a larger number of segments, both large and niche. Our quantitative model rationalizes the difference in strategies with the presence of segment-specific market costs.
We study the ability of firms of various sizes to cater to the taste of consumers who differ in their geographic location, store choice, and type or purchase history. Using data on purchases at the household-barcode level from Nielsen, we find that heterogeneity across consumer segments accounts for 39% of the variation in product appeal, which is a key determinant of firm size. Using a model with heterogeneous consumers, we find that consumer heterogeneity increases markups and profits, and such a positive effect is more pronounced for large firms. Furthermore, we find a link between firm size heterogeneity and the strategies firms follow in the presence of heterogeneous consumer segments. While smaller firms cater to the taste of few segments, typically the largest ones, larger firms exploit their wider scope to target a larger number of segments, both large and niche. Our quantitative model rationalizes the difference in strategies with the presence of segment-specific market costs.
Monopsonistic Competition, Trade, and the Profit Share. September, 2020 (under review)
I present an international trade model of monopsonistic competition, in which heterogeneous firms face upward sloping labor supply curves, and exploit their monopsony power over the wages of workers. The purpose of the model is to study the effects of monopsonistic competition on the relationship between international trade and the profit share. The model shows that monopsony power increases the profit share and reduces the labor share. Furthermore, the largest and most profitable firms have the largest profit share. While in a standard model with a Pareto distribution of productivity, the profit share is constant and independent of trade openness, in the presence of monopsonistic competition, trade can increase the profit share under reasonable assumptions for the parameter values. Monopsonistic competition is, thus, a contributing factor to the documented decline in the labor share and rise in corporate profits.
Quality Heterogeneity and Misallocation: The Welfare Benefits of Raising your Standards. May, 2020 (Revise and Resubmit at Journal of International Economics) (with Ariel Weinberger)
The Planner's Allocation The CES case Other VES Preferences
Inefficient allocation of production across heterogeneous firms is a major source of welfare loss, but frameworks generally ignore policies that reduce the misallocation. We study the welfare effects of policies that target the selection of surviving firms. As an example of such policies, we focus on product standards that force the small, low-quality firms to exit the market. Using data from Chile, we find that more restrictive standards are associated with a reallocation of domestic sales from small to large firms. Guided by this evidence, we study the welfare effects of standards in a model with monopolistically competitive, heterogeneous firms, and a general demand system. The standard improves welfare if low-quality firms over-produce in the market allocation relative to the efficient allocation. We estimate our model across Chilean industries and find that in several instances the imposed standard is too restrictive relative to a theoretical upper bound. Economy-wide, there are substantial possible welfare gains from moving to the optimal policy.
Inefficient allocation of production across heterogeneous firms is a major source of welfare loss, but frameworks generally ignore policies that reduce the misallocation. We study the welfare effects of policies that target the selection of surviving firms. As an example of such policies, we focus on product standards that force the small, low-quality firms to exit the market. Using data from Chile, we find that more restrictive standards are associated with a reallocation of domestic sales from small to large firms. Guided by this evidence, we study the welfare effects of standards in a model with monopolistically competitive, heterogeneous firms, and a general demand system. The standard improves welfare if low-quality firms over-produce in the market allocation relative to the efficient allocation. We estimate our model across Chilean industries and find that in several instances the imposed standard is too restrictive relative to a theoretical upper bound. Economy-wide, there are substantial possible welfare gains from moving to the optimal policy.
Flexibility and Productivity: Towards the Understanding of Firm Heterogeneity. May, 2020 (Revise and Resubmit at International Economic Review) (with Mingzhi Xu)
Online Appendix
We study the heterogeneity in scope and sales across multi-product firms. Guided by new firm-level evidence using China's customs data, we build a general-equilibrium model featuring firm heterogeneity in productivity and in flexibility, namely the ability to introduce new varieties in a destination at low costs. We estimate our model, finding suggestive evidence of a trade-off between productivity and flexibility: more productive firms are likely to be less flexible, as they pay higher fixed costs to introduce new varieties. The properties of such trade-off between productivity and flexibility are heterogeneous across industries. Our quantitative analysis shows that flexibility is the main determinant of a firm's scope, and ignoring it causes a large underestimation of the effects of changes in trade costs.
We study the heterogeneity in scope and sales across multi-product firms. Guided by new firm-level evidence using China's customs data, we build a general-equilibrium model featuring firm heterogeneity in productivity and in flexibility, namely the ability to introduce new varieties in a destination at low costs. We estimate our model, finding suggestive evidence of a trade-off between productivity and flexibility: more productive firms are likely to be less flexible, as they pay higher fixed costs to introduce new varieties. The properties of such trade-off between productivity and flexibility are heterogeneous across industries. Our quantitative analysis shows that flexibility is the main determinant of a firm's scope, and ignoring it causes a large underestimation of the effects of changes in trade costs.
Quality Misallocation, Trade, and Regulations. February 2020 (under review) (with Ariel Weinberger) (video presentation)
Domestic regulations on product standards are a key point of contention in modern trade agreements. We study the effects of international trade on the optimal level of restrictiveness of regulations in a multi-country model of monopolistically competitive firms that are heterogeneous in quality. We model regulations as a fixed cost that any firm selling to an economy must pay, consistent with stylized facts that we present. The fixed cost improves allocative efficiency, by forcing the exit of low-quality firms and reallocating production towards high-quality firms. Furthermore, the fixed cost generates a positive externality on the rest of the world. Our main finding is that international trade and regulations are complements: a reduction in trade costs reduces the optimal restrictiveness of regulations. We estimate our model and quantify the welfare consequences of imposing the optimal regulation, the extent of the positive externalities across countries, and the reduction in trade costs required to achieve equivalent welfare gains.
Publications
Has the Euro Shrunk the Band? Relative PPP Convergence in a Currency Union. January 2020, accepted at Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Online Appendix
I study the effects of entry to the European Monetary Union (EMU) on relative PPP convergence using monthly disaggregated price indexes from 32 European countries from 1999 to 2016. I apply Heckscher's insight that transaction costs create bands of inaction in which price differences are not arbitraged away. I examine the entry of Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia to the EMU, and estimate the bands of inaction before and after entry using a threshold autoregressive model. I find a positive effect of the EMU on relative PPP convergence: after entry the bands of inaction with EMU members fell by 17%. Cross sectional evidence further confirms the result and supports the theoretical prediction that bands of inaction are related to transaction costs.
I study the effects of entry to the European Monetary Union (EMU) on relative PPP convergence using monthly disaggregated price indexes from 32 European countries from 1999 to 2016. I apply Heckscher's insight that transaction costs create bands of inaction in which price differences are not arbitraged away. I examine the entry of Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia to the EMU, and estimate the bands of inaction before and after entry using a threshold autoregressive model. I find a positive effect of the EMU on relative PPP convergence: after entry the bands of inaction with EMU members fell by 17%. Cross sectional evidence further confirms the result and supports the theoretical prediction that bands of inaction are related to transaction costs.
Work in Progress
Multiproduct Firms, Market Size, and Competition (with Frederic Warzynski)
Publications - Pre Ph.D.
Exchange Rate Devaluation and Reshuffling of Global Jobs (with F. Sdogati). Journal of Economic Integration, 2013; 28(2):241-268. Awarded the Dae-Yang Prize for best article in 2013.
Other work
Published on ISPI (Italian Institute For International Political Studies)
Midterm elections: economia in ripresa eppure... October, 2014 (in Italian)
Le chances di Obama appese al filo della ripresa economica October, 2012 (in Italian)
Usa, cercasi stimolo fiscale per una rielezione June, 2012 (in Italian)
Midterm elections: economia in ripresa eppure... October, 2014 (in Italian)
Le chances di Obama appese al filo della ripresa economica October, 2012 (in Italian)
Usa, cercasi stimolo fiscale per una rielezione June, 2012 (in Italian)