Working Papers
Quality Misallocation, Trade, and Regulations. July, 2019 (with Ariel Weinberger)
Domestic regulations on product standards are a key point of contention in modern trade agreements. Although targeted at protecting domestic constituents, regulations are hotly debated in the context of international trade as they are often seen as a protectionist policy. We study the effects of international trade on the optimal level of restrictiveness of regulations in a two country model that features monopolistically competitive firms that are heterogeneous in quality. We model regulations as a fixed cost that any firm selling to an economy must pay, consistent with stylized facts that we present. The fixed cost reduces allocative inefficiency, by forcing the exit of low-quality firms and reallocating production towards high-quality firms. The main conclusion is that international trade and regulations are complements: a reduction in trade costs reduces the optimal restrictiveness of regulations. Furthermore, the model predicts that countries that have a higher average quality level and are larger optimally choose more restrictive regulations.
Oligopoly and Oligopsony in International Trade. June, 2019 (under review) (with Vladimir Tyazhelnikov)
We study the effects of international trade on firms' market power in final goods and inputs markets. Both oligopoly power in final goods markets and oligopsony power in inputs markets affect prices of final goods. Combining international trade data with measures of market concentration, we find that both oligopoly and oligopsony power increase unit prices of export goods. Furthermore, the effects of oligopsony power are economically larger than the effects of oligopoly power. We build a theoretical model of international trade in which firms are oligopolists in the market for final goods and oligopsonists in the market for inputs. International integration in final goods markets reduces oligopoly power but it has the opposite effect on oligopsony power. Similarly, input market integration reduces oligopsony power, but it increases oligopoly power.
Quality Heterogeneity and Misallocation: The Welfare Benefits of Raising your Standards. June, 2019 (under review) (with Ariel Weinberger)
The Planner's Allocation The CES case Other VES Preferences
Inefficient allocation of production across heterogeneous firms is a major source of welfare loss, but frameworks generally ignore policies that reduce the misallocation. We study the welfare effects of policies that target the selection of surviving firms. As an example of such policies, we focus on product standards that force the small, low-quality firms to exit the market. Using data from Chile, we find that more restrictive standards are associated with a reallocation of domestic sales from small to large firms. Guided by this evidence, we study the welfare effects of standards in a model with monopolistically competitive, heterogeneous firms, and a general demand system. The standard improves welfare if low-quality firms over-produce in the market allocation relative to the efficient allocation. We estimate our model across Chilean industries and find that in several instances the imposed standard is too restrictive relative to a theoretical upper bound.
Inefficient allocation of production across heterogeneous firms is a major source of welfare loss, but frameworks generally ignore policies that reduce the misallocation. We study the welfare effects of policies that target the selection of surviving firms. As an example of such policies, we focus on product standards that force the small, low-quality firms to exit the market. Using data from Chile, we find that more restrictive standards are associated with a reallocation of domestic sales from small to large firms. Guided by this evidence, we study the welfare effects of standards in a model with monopolistically competitive, heterogeneous firms, and a general demand system. The standard improves welfare if low-quality firms over-produce in the market allocation relative to the efficient allocation. We estimate our model across Chilean industries and find that in several instances the imposed standard is too restrictive relative to a theoretical upper bound.
Large Multiproduct Exporters Across Rich and Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence.
March, 2019 (under review)
Online Appendix
I study the welfare effects of trade in the presence of large firms producing multiple varieties. Large multiproduct exporters dominate trade flows and their scope decisions have new implications for the welfare gains from trade. Using data from the Exporter Dynamics Database, I document two stylized facts for large multiproduct exporters: 1) the product scope increases with the level of development of the destination proxied by per capita income, and 2) as evidence of cannibalization effects, there exists a non-monotone, hump-shaped relationship between the product scope and market share of a firm. Guided by the evidence, I build a model in which income and cannibalization effects drive the scope decisions of large firms. I derive a new formula for the welfare gains from trade where the change in welfare depends on the change and on the ex-ante level of the domestic market share of the typical domestic firm. Ignoring income or cannibalization effects causes mismeasurement of the US welfare gains. The sign and size of the mismeasurement is highly heterogeneous across industries.
I study the welfare effects of trade in the presence of large firms producing multiple varieties. Large multiproduct exporters dominate trade flows and their scope decisions have new implications for the welfare gains from trade. Using data from the Exporter Dynamics Database, I document two stylized facts for large multiproduct exporters: 1) the product scope increases with the level of development of the destination proxied by per capita income, and 2) as evidence of cannibalization effects, there exists a non-monotone, hump-shaped relationship between the product scope and market share of a firm. Guided by the evidence, I build a model in which income and cannibalization effects drive the scope decisions of large firms. I derive a new formula for the welfare gains from trade where the change in welfare depends on the change and on the ex-ante level of the domestic market share of the typical domestic firm. Ignoring income or cannibalization effects causes mismeasurement of the US welfare gains. The sign and size of the mismeasurement is highly heterogeneous across industries.
Has the Euro Shrunk the Band? Relative PPP Convergence in a Currency Union. January, 2019, revise and resubmit at Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Online Appendix
I study the effects of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on relative PPP convergence using monthly disaggregated price indexes from 32 European countries from 1999 to 2016. I apply Heckscher's insight that transaction costs create bands of inaction in which price differences are not arbitraged away, and I estimate the bands of inaction using a threshold autoregressive model. My findings suggest that the being a member of the EMU is associated with a reduction in transaction costs: the bands of inaction between countries in the EMU are 17% lower than the average band. Time series evidence from the entry in the EMU of selected countries further confirms the result.
I study the effects of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on relative PPP convergence using monthly disaggregated price indexes from 32 European countries from 1999 to 2016. I apply Heckscher's insight that transaction costs create bands of inaction in which price differences are not arbitraged away, and I estimate the bands of inaction using a threshold autoregressive model. My findings suggest that the being a member of the EMU is associated with a reduction in transaction costs: the bands of inaction between countries in the EMU are 17% lower than the average band. Time series evidence from the entry in the EMU of selected countries further confirms the result.
Flexibility and Productivity: Towards the Understanding of Firm Heterogeneity for Multi-product Exporters. October, 2018 (with Mingzhi Xu), revise and resubmit at Journal of International Economics
We study the heterogeneity in scope and sales across multi-product exporters. Guided by new firm-level evidence using China's customs data, we build a general-equilibrium model featuring firm heterogeneity in productivity and in flexibility, namely the ability to introduce new varieties in a destination at low costs. We estimate our model, finding suggestive evidence of a trade-off between productivity and flexibility: more productive firms are likely to be less flexible, as they pay higher fixed costs to introduce new varieties. The properties of such trade-off between productivity and flexibility are heterogeneous across industries. In the spirit of Hottman et al. (2016), we find firms' flexibility accounts for 65 to 75% of the total variation in scope across firms and destinations, and 12 to 16% of the total variation in sales.
Work in Progress
Large Firms in Retail Markets: Multiple Products for Heterogeneous Consumers (with Mingzhi Xu and Robert C. Feenstra)
Publications - Pre Ph.D.
Exchange Rate Devaluation and Reshuffling of Global Jobs (with F. Sdogati). Journal of Economic Integration, 2013; 28(2):241-268. Awarded the Dae-Yang Prize for best article in 2013.
Other work
Published on ISPI (Italian Institute For International Political Studies)
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